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Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition download ebook

by Saul A. Kripke

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition download ebook
ISBN:
0631130772
ISBN13:
978-0631130772
Author:
Saul A. Kripke
Publisher:
Basil Blackwell; 1st Edition edition (1982)
Language:
Pages:
160 pages
ePUB:
1659 kb
Fb2:
1495 kb
Other formats:
lit txt lrf mobi
Category:
Philosophy
Subcategory:
Rating:
4.9

clearly and compellingly presented. an exemplary piece of exposition.

clearly and compellingly presented. Times Literary Supplement "A detailed examination of what is clearly a central theme in Wittgenstein's writings.

As noted by Kripke himself, the work is more an elaboration of Kripke's thoughts in reaction to the Philosophical Investigations, than a truly dedicated attempt to uncover Wittgenstein's perspective.

Kripke argues that Wittgenstein discovers a new kind of philosophical skepticism, which radically breaks from all previous forms of skepticism.

In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of. .

In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule. Kripke's boyhood genius did not flicker out in the 1960s, when he studied at Harvard, Oxford, Princeton and Rockefeller University or, more accurately, when he worked independently at these institutions and had occasional contact with his surroundings. His academic training was unique. He ascended directly to full professorships, without ever earning a doctorate.

Includes bibliographical references and index. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. I. Title 192 81-20070 B3376. W564K74 AACR2 ISBN 0-674-95401-7 (paper). Most of the exposition which follows occurred to the present writer some time ago, in the academic year 1962-3.

In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgensteina s analysis of the notion of following a rule. clearly andcompellingly presented. TimesLiterary Supplement "A detailed examination of what is clearly acentral theme in Wittgenstein s writings.

Download PDF book format. 192 19. Personal Name: Kripke, Saul . 1940-. Publication, Distribution, et. Cambridge, Mass. Choose file format of this book to download: pdf chm txt rtf doc. Download this format book. International Standard Book Number (ISBN): 0674954009.

Similar books and articles. An Elementary Exposition. Saul A. Kripke - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):819-821. Harry Deutsch - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):819-821.

In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.
Reviews:
  • Rrd
Originally published in 1982, Saul Kripke's Rules and Private Language has become a classic in contemporary analytic philosophy and probably the most notable (if contentious) analysis of Wittgenstein's later work.

As noted by Kripke himself, the work is more an elaboration of Kripke's thoughts in reaction to the Philosophical Investigations, than a truly dedicated attempt to uncover Wittgenstein's perspective. In large part as a result of this bold approach, Kripke comments have become both extremely well known and controversial. Readers unfamiliar (or rusty) with Kripke may find the pertinent chapters in Scott Soames' excellent Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2: The Age of Meaning helpful in preparing for this text.

Overall, I recommend this book to readers of analytic philosophy - it is a relatively quick and enjoyable read. Familiarity with the Philosophical Investigations, however, is likely a prerequisite to understanding and appreciating this text.
  • WOGY
Great classic
  • Jube
Saul Aaron Kripke (born 1940) is an American philosopher and logician, who is Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at Princeton University, and teaches Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center. His writings include Naming and Necessity,Reference and Existence,Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1, etc.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1982 book, “The main part of this work has been delivered at various places as lectures, series of lectures, or seminars. It constitutes, as I say, ‘an elementary exposition’ of what I take to be the central thread of Wittgenstein’s later work on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics, including my interpretation of the ‘private language argument,’ which on my view is principally to be explicated in terms of the problem of ‘following a rule.’ A postscript presents another problem Wittgenstein saw in the conception of private language, which leads to a discussion of some aspects of his views on the problem of other minds… I had hoped to add a second postscript on the philosophy of mathematics. Time has not permitted this…”

He points out in the Introduction, “It should be borne in mind that ‘Philosophical Investigations’ is not a systematic philosophical work where conclusions, once definitely established, need not be reargued. Rather the ‘Investigations’ is written as a perpetual dialectic, where persisting worries, expressed by the voice of the imaginary interlocutor, are never definitively silenced. Since the work is not presented in the form of a deductive argument with definitive theses as conclusions, the same ground is covered repeatedly, from the point of view of various special cases and from different angles, with the hope that the entire process will help the reader see the problems rightly.” (Pg. 3)

He explains, “I suspect… that to attempt to present Wittgenstein’s argument precisely is to some extent to falsify it. Probably many of my formulations and recastings of the argument are done in a way Wittgenstein would not himself approve. So the present paper should be thought of as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him.” (Pg. 5)

He observes, “when I concentrate on what is now in my mind, what instructions can be found there? How can I be said to be acting on the basis of these instructions when I act in the future? The infinitely many cases of the table are not in my mind for my future self to consult. To say that there is a general rule in my mind that tells me how to add in the future is only to throw the problem back on to other rules that also seem to be given only in terms of finitely many cases. What can there be in my mind that I make use of when I act in the future? It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air.” (Pg. 22)

He notes, “By ‘reading’ Wittgenstein means reading out loud what is written or printed and similar activities: he is not concerned with understanding what is written. I myself, like many of my coreligionists, first learned to ‘read’ Hebrew in this sense before I could understand more than a few words of the language. Reading in this sense is a simple case of ‘following a rule.’” (Pg. 45)

He suggests, “Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced. Of course he does not wish to leave us with his problem, but to solve it: the skeptical conclusion is insane and intolerable. It is his solution, I will argue, that contains the argument against ‘private language.’” (Pg. 60)

He states, “The main problem is not, ‘How can we show private language---or some other special form of language---to be IMPOSSIBLE?’; rather it is, ‘How can we show ANY LANGUAGE at all (public, private, or what-have-you) to be POSSIBLE?’ Is it not that calling a sensation ‘pain’ is easy, and Wittgenstein must invent a difficulty. One the contrary, Wittgenstein’s main problem is that it appears that he has shown ALL language, ALL concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible.” (Pg. 62)

He suggests, “If our considerations so far are correct, the answer is that, if one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding the person who adopts it can have NO substantive component. There are, we have seen, no truth conditions or facts in virtue of which it can be the case that he accords with his past intentions or not. As long as we regard him as following a rule ‘privately,’ so that we pay attention to HIS justification conditions alone, all we can say is that he is licensed to follow the rule as it strikes him.” (Pg. 89)

This book will be of great interest to anyone studying Kripke, or analytic philosophy in general.
  • Azago
Saul Aaron Kripke (born 1940) is an American philosopher and logician, who is Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at Princeton University, and teaches Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center. His writings include Naming and Necessity,Reference and Existence,Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1, etc.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1982 book, “The main part of this work has been delivered at various places as lectures, series of lectures, or seminars. It constitutes, as I say, ‘an elementary exposition’ of what I take to be the central thread of Wittgenstein’s later work on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics, including my interpretation of the ‘private language argument,’ which on my view is principally to be explicated in terms of the problem of ‘following a rule.’ A postscript presents another problem Wittgenstein saw in the conception of private language, which leads to a discussion of some aspects of his views on the problem of other minds… I had hoped to add a second postscript on the philosophy of mathematics. Time has not permitted this…”

He points out in the Introduction, “It should be borne in mind that ‘Philosophical Investigations’ is not a systematic philosophical work where conclusions, once definitely established, need not be reargued. Rather the ‘Investigations’ is written as a perpetual dialectic, where persisting worries, expressed by the voice of the imaginary interlocutor, are never definitively silenced. Since the work is not presented in the form of a deductive argument with definitive theses as conclusions, the same ground is covered repeatedly, from the point of view of various special cases and from different angles, with the hope that the entire process will help the reader see the problems rightly.” (Pg. 3)

He explains, “I suspect… that to attempt to present Wittgenstein’s argument precisely is to some extent to falsify it. Probably many of my formulations and recastings of the argument are done in a way Wittgenstein would not himself approve. So the present paper should be thought of as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him.” (Pg. 5)

He observes, “when I concentrate on what is now in my mind, what instructions can be found there? How can I be said to be acting on the basis of these instructions when I act in the future? The infinitely many cases of the table are not in my mind for my future self to consult. To say that there is a general rule in my mind that tells me how to add in the future is only to throw the problem back on to other rules that also seem to be given only in terms of finitely many cases. What can there be in my mind that I make use of when I act in the future? It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air.” (Pg. 22)

He notes, “By ‘reading’ Wittgenstein means reading out loud what is written or printed and similar activities: he is not concerned with understanding what is written. I myself, like many of my coreligionists, first learned to ‘read’ Hebrew in this sense before I could understand more than a few words of the language. Reading in this sense is a simple case of ‘following a rule.’” (Pg. 45)

He suggests, “Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced. Of course he does not wish to leave us with his problem, but to solve it: the skeptical conclusion is insane and intolerable. It is his solution, I will argue, that contains the argument against ‘private language.’” (Pg. 60)

He states, “The main problem is not, ‘How can we show private language---or some other special form of language---to be IMPOSSIBLE?’; rather it is, ‘How can we show ANY LANGUAGE at all (public, private, or what-have-you) to be POSSIBLE?’ Is it not that calling a sensation ‘pain’ is easy, and Wittgenstein must invent a difficulty. One the contrary, Wittgenstein’s main problem is that it appears that he has shown ALL language, ALL concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible.” (Pg. 62)

He suggests, “If our considerations so far are correct, the answer is that, if one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding the person who adopts it can have NO substantive component. There are, we have seen, no truth conditions or facts in virtue of which it can be the case that he accords with his past intentions or not. As long as we regard him as following a rule ‘privately,’ so that we pay attention to HIS justification conditions alone, all we can say is that he is licensed to follow the rule as it strikes him.” (Pg. 89)

This book will be of great interest to anyone studying Kripke, or analytic philosophy in general.