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Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1 download ebook

by G. E. M. Anscombe,Heikki Nyman,G. H. von Wright,Ludwig Wittgenstein

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1 download ebook
ISBN:
0631130616
ISBN13:
978-0631130611
Author:
G. E. M. Anscombe,Heikki Nyman,G. H. von Wright,Ludwig Wittgenstein
Publisher:
Wiley-Blackwell (January 8, 1991)
Language:
Pages:
428 pages
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1342 kb
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1240 kb
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Psychology
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4.1

Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1889 - 1951 - was an Austrian-British philosopher who taught at the University of Cambridge and is known .

Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1889 - 1951 - was an Austrian-British philosopher who taught at the University of Cambridge and is known as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. The majority of his writing was published after his death. G. E. M. Anscombe - 1919-2001 - read classics and philosophy at St. Hugh's College, Oxford from 1937 to 1941 in which year she married the philosopher Peter Geach. The companion volume to this is Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman - 1993. Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1964 - Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology". Jeffrey Zekauskas - 1982 - Ethics 93:606. Seeing Connexions" in Psychology: An Explication and Application of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method. Michael Allan Tissaw - 1999 - Dissertation, Georgetown University. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Von Wright, R. Rhees Ànd .

ISBN: 978-0-631-13061-1 January 1991 Wiley-Blackwell 428 Pages. Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1889 - 1951 - was an Austrian-British philosopher who taught at the University of Cambridge and is known as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Heikki Nyman, G. Anscombe. These two volumes must be welcomed in particular for the illumination they shed. on Wittgenstein's already published discussions. the characteristic deluge of examples, analogies, questions and challenges is as ever, maddening, provoking and thought-provoking, and with the earlier-published works they constitute not just the most detailed but also the best treatment of these profoundly important issues. Kathleen Wilkes, "Times Higher Education Supplement".

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II (RPP II), ed. by G. von Wright H. Nyman. Philosophical Investigations (PI), ed. Anscombe R. Rhees. by C. Luckhardt M. A. Aue, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1980, § 32. oogle Scholar. 6. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Anscombe, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1953. 7. This paper is an earlier version of Chapter 8 of J. Schulte, Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology, Claredon Press, Oxford 1993.

Ludwig Wittgenstein considered his chief contribution to be in the philosophy of mathematics, a topic to which he devoted much of his work between 1929 and 1944.

From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption.

Translated by G. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. It elaborates Wittgenstein’s views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, .

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Wittgenstein’s reflections on the human mind are central to his later philosophy. von Wright, translated by . von Wright, and Heikki Nyman, translated by . He pairs off quite nicely with Descartes, his predecessor by exactly three centuries, and the founder of philosophical psychology. Although great philosophers never come two of a kind, these men are strikingly alike.

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ˈvɪtɡənʃtaɪn, -staɪn/; German: ; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and . .

From 1929 to 1947, Wittgenstein taught at the University of Cambridge.

"These two volumes must be welcomed in particular for the illumination they shed ... on Wittgenstein's already published discussions ... the characteristic deluge of examples, analogies, questions and challanges is as ever, maddening, provoking and thought-provoking, and with the earlier-published works they constitute not just the most detailed but also the best treatment of these profoundly important issues."Kathleen Wilkes, Times Higher Education Supplement
Reviews:
  • Kajikus
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher whose books such as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations are among the acknowledged “classics” of 20th century philosophy. Born into a wealthy family, he gave all of his inheritance away, served in the Austrian Army during World War I, taught schoolchildren in remote Austrian villages, but ultimately taught at Cambridge for many years. The Tractatus was the only book he published during his lifetime, but his papers have been posthumously edited, and notes of lectures taken by his students have been transcribed, and have resulted in many published books, such as Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, & WHAT Religious Belief,Philosophical Grammar,Philosophical Remarks,The Blue and Brown Books,Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,Remarks on Colour,Zettel, etc.

The companion volume to this is Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2.

Wittgenstein worked on the philosophy of psychology from 1946-1949; a few of the remarks printed in this book were previously included in Volume 2 of the Philosophical Investigations, or in Zettel, but the vast majority were printed here for the first time.

He admits, “The basic evil of Russell’s logic, and also of mine in the Tractatus, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace examples, and then presupposed as understood in full generality.” (§38)

He observes, “The APPROPRIATE word. How do we find it? Describe this! In contrast to this: I find the right term for a curve, after I have made particular measurements of it… I see that the word is appropriate even before I know, and even when I never know, WHY it is appropriate.” (§72-73)

He comments: “‘But depression is surely a FEELING; you surely don’t want to say that you are depressed and don’t feel it? And where do you feel it?’ That depends on what you call ‘feeling it.’ If I direct my attention to my bodily feelings, I notice a very slight headache, a slight discomfort in the region of my stomach, perhaps a certain tiredness. But do I mean that, when I say I am severely depressed? And yet I say again: ‘I feel a burden weighing on my soul.’ ‘Well, I can’t express it any differently!’---But how remarkable that I say it that way and express it differently!” (§133)

He states, “MUCH can be said about a fine aesthetic difference---this is very important. That is to say, the first utterance is of course merely ‘THIS word fits, THIS one does not’ or the like; but then there may be discussion of all the widely ramified connexions made by each of these words. That is to say, it is NOT all over once that first judgment has been made; rather what it depends on is the FIELD of each word.” (§357)

He says, “The way you use the word ‘God’ shews, not WHOM you mean, but what you mean.” (§475)

He states, “ ‘One can’t describe the aroma of coffee.’ But couldn’t one imagine being able to do so? And WHAT does one have to imagine for this? If someone says: ‘One can’t describe the aroma,’ one may ask him: ‘What MEANS of description do you want to use? What ELEMENTS?’” (§553)

He wonders, “But isn’t there a connection between the grammatical ‘privacy’ of thoughts and the fact that we generally cannot guess the thoughts of someone else before he utters them? But there is such a thing as guessing thoughts in the sense that someone says to me: ‘I know what you have just thought’… and I have to admit that he has guessed my thoughts right. But in fact this happens very seldom. I often sit without talking for several minutes in my class, and thoughts go through my head; but surely none of my audience could guess what I have been thinking to myself. Yet it would also be possible that someone should guess them and write them down just as if I had uttered them out loud. And if he shewed me what he had written, I should have to say ‘Yes, I thought just that to myself.’ And here, e.g., this question would be undecidable: whether I am not making a mistake; whether I really thought that, or, influenced by his writing, I am firmly IMAGINING MYSELF to have thought precisely that. And the word ‘undecidable’ belongs to the description of the language-game.” (§568)

He suggests, “The way music speaks. Don’t forget that even though a poem is framed in the language of information, it is not employed in the language-game of information. Might not one imagine someone who had never known music, and who came to us and heard someone playing a reflective piece of Chopin, being convinced that this was a language and that people were merely keeping the sense secret from him? Verbal language contains a strong musical element. (A sigh, a modulation of tone for a question, for an announcement, for longing; all the countless GESTURES in the vocal cadences.)” (§888)

He asserts, “No supposition seems to me more than natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the SYSTEM continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?” (§903)

He observes, “Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A metaphysical operation is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is a conceptual one.” (§949)

He contends, “Thinking in terms of physiological processes is extremely dangerous in connexion with the clarification of conceptual problems in psychology. Thinking in physiological hypotheses deludes us sometimes with false difficulties, sometimes with false solutions. The best prophylactic against this is the thought that I don’t know at all whether the humans I am acquainted with actually have a nervous system.” (§1063)

He argues, “ ‘Thinking is an enigmatic process, and we are a long way off from complete understanding of it.’ And now one starts experimenting. Evidently, without realizing WHAT it is that makes thinking enigmatic to us. The experimental method does SOMETHING; its failure to solve the problem is blamed on its still being in its beginnings. It is as if one were to try and determine what matter and spirit are by chemical experiments.” (§1093)

These ideas and hints and thoughts of Wittgenstein are, as always, thought-provoking and stimulating. These two books will be “must reading” for anyone studying the development of his later thought.
  • Jox
I would say that there are at least fifty shades of grey in this book.